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The Battle of 
Blair Mountain: 
A New Narrative 






On August 25th, 1921, at Blair Mountain in Logan County, West Virginia, a battle was fought between union workers of the United 
Mine Workers of America and a collection of local 
police, mercenaries, and federal troops, an event that 
was part of the larger conflict: the West Virginia Mine 
Wars1. While only taking place over the course of a 
week, the Battle of Blair Mountain, as it came to be 
known, was the largest labor uprising in American 
history, as well as the largest armed uprising to this day 
since the Civil War. Despite its scale and significance, 
the Battle of Blair Mountain has faded into relative 
obscurity over the years, placing its history at a risk of 
being forgotten entirely. This fact directly inspired the 
writing of this piece as its goal is to call new audiences’ 
attention to the battle’s history and ideally, inspire 
further study of the subject. As we fast approach the 
hundredth anniversary of the battle, now seems like as 
great a time as any to revisit its history, by constructing 
a new narrative based on a critical analysis of the 
primary and scholarly accounts of the battle that exist, 
in an effort to examine not only the battle’s immediate 
impact on the coal industry, and public perception of 
the American labor movement as a whole, but also 
to explore how the challenges presented by the battle 
mirror current events in our society. 
While the West Virginia Mine Wars is a topic 
that is at least familiar within American labor history 
circles, the Battle of Blair Mountain is an event 
severely lacking in scholarship, especially considering 
its fame and impact at the time it occurred. West 
Virginia maintains extensive records and accounts of 
the battle both in the state archives and at the West 
Virginia Mine Wars Museum, but unfortunately, most 
of their resources have not yet been digitized, although 
those that have, provided a wealth of information in 
the form of first-hand accounts or newspaper articles 
written immediately following the battle. The museum 
was beginning the process of moving to a new building 
when the Covid-19 pandemic occurred, which has 
provided challenges in accessing their archives. 
Fortunately, the museum has quite recently reopened 
their doors to the public, meaning their resources are 
more readily available. A visit to the museum in the 
1  Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York City: Basic Books, 2006), 
168. Miners began assembling and marching on Blair on August 24th, but the first exchanges of fire did not occur until August 25th 
between Sheriff Chafin’s men and UMWA miners.
near future will hopefully yield follow-up research 
to this piece in the form of an additional article. The 
one academic source that has been most beneficial to 
this study from a historiographic standpoint is Robert 
Shogan’s (2006) book, The Battle of Blair Mountain: 
The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. Unlike 
most books on the West Virginia Mine Wars, which 
briefly touch upon Blair Mountain, Shogan’s work, 
as the title would suggest, is exclusively dedicated 
to the Battle of Blair Mountain, making it by far the 
most valuable scholarly account for the purposes of 
this research2. While Shogan’s work, similarly to the 
primary-source accounts utilized in this project, does 
express bias, in his case in favor of the United Mine 
Workers of America, he approaches the issue in a 
unique manner. During an interview in 2004 for Focus, 
an Illinois University radio talk show, when asked why 
the Battle of Blair Mountain was significant to labor 
history, Shogan clarified that he viewed the battle as 
an important part of American history, as a whole, that 
has ramifications beyond the confines of labor itself3. 
This perspective, in addition to his excellent research, 
is what makes Shogan’s work so creditable, as while 
he does show a greater degree of sympathy to one side 
in the conflict, he approaches the subject of the battle 
with a nationwide view that relieves him of the burden 
of being bogged down by local politics and economic 
interests. While this present article is nowhere near as 
in depth a study of the battle as Shogan’s, his work 
is more focused on the experience of the miners 
themselves, whereas this article seeks to examine all 
parties involved as well as analyze the impact the battle 
has left over the past hundred years. 
To better understand why the Battle of Blair 
Mountain was fought, and how it escalated to such a 
large conflict, some context is needed both on a national 
and a local level. Leading up to 1921, when the Battle 
of Blair Mountain was fought, unions were in a position 
of great turmoil. During World War I, which ended 
only a few short years before, unions, especially those 
related to mining and in particular coal production, 
gained a great deal of power and national influence. 
This may have in part been due to national sympathy 
towards industrial work as a whole that was heavily 
featured in wartime propaganda but was primarily due 
to the national high demand for coal at a time when 
labor was in extremely short supply4. As coal mining 
companies did not have the luxury of large amounts of 
2  Thomas, G. Andrews, Killing for Coal. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), Chap. 5, Out of the Depths and on to the March 
touches upon the Battle of Blair Mountain, although the book is primarily focused on the Ludlow Massacre of 1914, an earlier conflict 
in the greater labor struggle surrounding the coal industry. Corbin, David. Life, Work, and Rebellion in the Coal Fields: The Southern 
West Virginia Miners, 1880-1922. (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1989),182, 218, 219, 221. Corbin’s book covers the West 
Virginia Coal Wars as a whole, and, as such, does not focus on the Battle of Blair Mountain. Lane, Winthrop D. Civil War in West 
Virginia. (B. W. Huebsch, inc.) New York, 1921, 105-109. Lane discusses escalation to the Battle of Blair Mountain and addresses 
previous conflicts in Logan County specifically, but as Civil War in West Virginia was released in 1921, the same year as the battle, it 
is unlikely Lane would have had the time or resources to include the Battle of Blair Mountain into their work in any further capacity.
3  Focus; “The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising,” 2004-07-07, WILL Illinois Public Media, 
American Archive of Public Broadcasting.
4  Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York City: Basic Books, 2006), 
140. While the coal industry hit a boom during the war, the highest average income of skilled miners in West Virginia was only $1,060 
annually. These, even for the period, extremely low wages were a motivating factor for union resistance to the coal industry, but also 
an indication of the lack of success the UMWA had in West Virginia when compared to other states.
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easily hirable labor during the war, coal miners were 
able to negotiate better wages and more rights that led 
to expansive growth in union power.
As industrial unions rose in power, one in 
particular gained national influence, the United Mine 
Workers of America (UMWA)5. While the UMWA 
had mining operations across several states, they 
made minimal inroads into West Virginia as coal 
corporations in the state managed to maintain control 
of their operations during World War I6. After the war, 
as the number of people in the job market increased 
once more along with a reduction in the demand for 
coal, union expansion was somewhat diminished7. The 
UMWA was still by far one of the strongest unions 
in the country, but their growth, especially in West 
Virginia, stagnated as the nation’s reliance on unions 
lessened. This left West Virginia a divided state, where 
counties were either strongly sympathetic to union 
operations or strongly opposed. This divide between 
union workers and sympathizers against the holdout 
corporate mining operations and their allies laid the 
foundation for the West Virginia Mine Wars.
While other clashes over mine labor preceded 
the Battle of Blair Mountain,8 the most important event 
happened in the neighboring county, Mingo, in the 
coal mining town of Matewan9. On May 19th, 1920, 
a group of men from the Baldwin-Felts Detective 
Agency, operating on behalf of West Virginian coal 
operators, arrived in Matewan10 to serve eviction 
notices to residents living at Stone Mountain’s coal 
camp.11 The detectives’ second objective, and reason 
for coming to Matewan, was to break up efforts at 
unionizing the coal fields. The detectives were fully 
prepared to carry out both these tasks as they served 
the benefits of their contractors, non-union coal 
companies operating in the southern West Virginia 
coal fields. Matewan’s Chief of Police, Sid Hatfield, 
along with Matewan’s Mayor, Cabell Testerman, both 
union sympathizers and supporters of the UMWA,12 
confronted the detectives and opposed the legality of 
5  Ibid, 2. The Union Mine Workers of America were the most powerful union in the nation coming into the 1920s.
6  Ibid, 271. Post WWI, the coal industry, as a whole, experienced decline, but non-union operators were able to capitalize on this 
transition with more success than the UMWA.
7  Bituminous Operators' Special Committee to the United States Coal Commission, “The United Mine Workers in West Virginia.” [S.l. 
: s.n., 1923], 3. The UMWA failed to attain exclusive rights to mining operations in West Virginia in 1919, which was a major loss for 
the union and an escalation factor in hostilities between union and non-union coal operators in the state.
8  William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010), 358. In addition to the Matewan shootout, the incident at 
Lick Creek was a contributing motivation to the Battle of Blair Mountain, especially due to the fact that it prompted the implementation 
of martial law in the environment of its occurrence.
9  Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006), 3. 
Matewan, being in the direct center of the richest coal fields in West Virginia, became a focal point for the greater West Virginia Coal 
Wars due to massive commercial value.
10  Ibid, 1. The Baldwin-Felts Detectives, seven in total, were all armed and “had all been tried and relied on” according to Tom Felts, 
brother to Albert Felts. Blizzard contests the number of detectives present, citing their numbers as “more than a dozen.” (Blizzard 131).
11  William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 125. Six families in total were evicted under the authority of 
Circuit Judge James Damron, who acted as an attorney for the coal operators in later case against the UMWA.
12  Ibid, 130. While Mingo County as a whole was primarily controlled by non-union coal operators, Matewan, itself, was known to be 
very sympathetic to the union cause, making it a focal point of the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency’s union-busting campaign on 
behalf of the coal operators.
the evictions they were dispensing. This disagreement 
led to a shootout, in which the identity of the aggressor 
is up for debate, between the Baldwin-Felts detectives 
and Matewan locals including Hatfield, coal miners, 
and members of the UMWA. The conflict left seven 
detectives and three locals dead, including Albert and 
Lee Felts and Mayor Cabell Testerman. 
The Matewan shootout could have easily been 
a stand-alone conflict in the history of the West Virginia 
Mine Wars, but due to the direct results of the conflict, 
it sparked even larger events.13 Several members of the 
UMWA local leadership were arrested and held in jail 
in Mingo County with charges relating to the shootout. 
Sid Hadfield also had charges brought up against him, 
which some sources claim were unfounded and had 
only been drawn up as an excuse to get Hatfield out in 
the open. While Hatfield’s participation in the Matewan 
shootout is undeniable, and charges against him could 
reasonably be considered at the very least, suspicions 
as to the dubious nature of the charges against Hatfield 
could be seen as valid considering the following 
events. Upon arriving for his court hearing, Hatfield 
was murdered on the courthouse steps by members of 
the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency. A coverup to give 
the appearance of a shootout between Hatfield and the 
detectives was staged but was unsuccessful in fooling 
the UMWA, who were outraged at these actions. 
With two of their allies, Testerman and Hatfield, 
both dead along with their leadership imprisoned, not 
to mention years of previous tension and hostility with 
coal operators, the UMWA began planning retaliatory 
action. Within a year of the Matewan shootout’s 
explosive conclusion, and mere months since the 
imprisonment of UMWA leaders and the murder of 
Hatfield, UMWA miners were called upon by their 
leadership to arm themselves, mobilize across the 
southern West Virginia coal fields, and began to march 
on Mingo County. Their goal was to free their fellow 
UMWA members who were imprisoned there and take 
revenge on those who fought against their efforts to 
unionize the southern West Virginia coal fields. Beyond 
the coal industry, itself, the UMWA sought revenge on 
local West Virginia government officials, especially 
law enforcement and judges who were either in the 
pocket of coal operators or assumed to be. These were 
the types of people UMWA believed to have been 
responsible in orchestrating Hatfield’s murder as well 
as being the men in charge of detaining their fellow 
union members. To reach Mingo, the UMWA workers 
needed to cross through neighboring Logan County. 
Knowing this and selecting the most strategic point 
of defense, Logan County police, local residents, and 
mercenary vigilante forces, some in the employ of the 
coal corporations, bunkered down in the town of Blair 
at the base of Blair Mountain and armed themselves. 
The UMWA marchers, who were also armed, upon 
arriving in Blair, quickly realized they would need to 
fight their way over the mountain to reach Mingo, and 
thus, the stage for the Battle of Blair Mountain was set. 
Accounts of the Battle of Blair Mountain 
provide drastically different narratives of the events 
due to a combination of bias and perspective skewing 
13  Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York City: Basic Books, 2006), 
121. May 19th, 1921. Morgan County declared martial law a year to the day after the Matewan shootout, which further escalated 
tensions between coal operators and miners only a few short months before the Battle of Blair Mountain broke out.
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the facts. While no account is without its issues, 
the three majority perspectives to be taken into 
consideration are the UMWA, coal operators, and 
Blair locals. A fourth, extremely important perspective 
is that of the United States military as they were the 
largest deciding factor of the outcome of the battle, 
but unfortunately, documentation of the battle from 
a military perspective is not as readily available and 
as such cannot be discussed for the purposes of this 
research, although it will be referenced in context of 
other sources. Before detailing the events of the battle, 
itself, it is worth mentioning context behind each of the 
three factions’ sources. 
The UMWA’s account of the Battle of Blair 
Mountain is best detailed in William Blizzard’s book, 
When Miners March, which contains his narrative of 
the battle and its aftermath. What makes Blizzard’s 
account so valuable is the role he played during the 
battle as he was both one of the leaders of the march 
itself, as well as the UMWA’s military commander 
during the battle, and, after the fact, stepped forward 
to take primary responsibility for the UMWA’s actions 
during the subsequent trials. Unsurprisingly, Blizzard’s 
book is heavily biased in favor of the UMWA, but his 
account is no less valuable for it contextualizes why 
the union decided upon armed resistance in the first 
place. 
Contrasting Blizzard’s account is the Bituminous 
Operators' Special Committee to the United States 
Coal Commission, “The United Mine Workers in West 
Virginia,” which was a report written two years after 
the battle that both details some of its events as well 
as makes a case for more aggressive legal action to be 
carried out against unions, in particular, the UMWA, 
for their part in the armed uprising. Unlike Blizzard’s 
book, which reads as a more chronological history 
of the UMWA in West Virginia, the coal commission 
report touches on a wide range of labor conflict across 
the country, and while it focuses primarily on the 
UMWA and was penned in response to the Battle of 
Blair Mountain, it is not strictly an account of the battle 
itself. A clear goal of the report is to paint the actions 
of the UMWA as dangerous and in direct opposition 
to American laws and values. The most obvious, 
and all together inaccurate means of conveying this 
message, is the claims in the report that the UMWA 
were communist. No direct evidence to support this 
claim was presented outside of the fact that the UMWA 
sought better wages and working conditions for miners, 
and some of their membership expressed radical views, 
although those same beliefs were not necessarily held 
union wide. Framing the UMWA as a communist union 
was done with the intention of painting the union as 
anti-government, a commonly held stereotype about 
communism at the time. In this regard, the claim could 
not be more inaccurate as the UMWA was a fiercely 
patriotic union with a large veteran membership and 
a history of complying with and supporting federal 
legislation and action. Communism absolutely had a 
significant role to play within the greater picture of 
the American labor movement, but this stereotypical 
assertion that all communists were anti-government 
absolutely does not hold true, especially in context of 
the UMWA specifically, and to categorize the union 
under the umbrella of communism, in this context, is 
inaccurate and intentionally manipulative. The claims 
of communism brought up in the coal commission 
report were intended both as rationalization for the 
coal industry’s actions during the Battle of Blair 
Mountain and as a means of discrediting the UMWA’s 
calls for fairer wages for miners. The strategy here 
was to paint the UMWA as an anti-government 
organization by leaning into the stereotype at the time 
that all communists actively sought the destruction of 
government. This inaccurate assertion about the nature 
of communism and its relationship with government 
was far from accurate, but an easily exploitable avenue 
of justification at the time. While, once again, the report 
is heavily biased in favor of coal mining operations and 
denounces the UMWA, it has the additional advantage 
of contextualizing the Battle of Blair Mountain in 
relation to nationwide labor struggles. 
The last, and possibly most important 
perspective is that of Blair locals. The residents of Blair, 
based on first-hand accounts, were somewhat divided 
in their loyalties when it came to the actual battle itself, 
but for the most part, they either actively or passively 
were against any disruption to the coal industry, which 
could produce serious consequences to the local 
economy. Blair residents’ loyalty to the coal operators 
was therefore either grudgingly performed out of self- 
preservation, or, in the case of local law enforcement, 
tied directly to monetary benefit. The organization of 
Blair’s defenses against the UMWA was spearheaded 
by Sheriff Don Chafin, a divisive figure feared by 
everyone involved in the conflict, and most of the Blair 
residents’ first- hand accounts center their narratives 
around his actions more than anyone else’s14. This 
research does not focus on a single narrative from Blair 
residents, but rather a compiled account put together 
by the Logan County West Virginia Genealogical 
Society and the Matewan Oral History Project15 in 
the form of a series of interviews with residents who 
lived through the battle. Therefore, accounts from 
Blair residents are woven from multiple narratives as 
opposed to a singularly compiled source like Blizzard’s 
book or the coal commission report. Incorporating a 
local perspective on the battle is extremely important 
because it may be the least biased account out of any 
that appears, but the greatest shortcoming is their lack 
of comprehensiveness, necessitating a more cobbled 
together approach at constructing their narrative as 
opposed to the very clear and straightforward accounts 
by Blizzard and the coal commission report. 
The events that collectively can be referred to 
as the Battle of Blair Mountain truly began on August 
25, 1921, when the first exchanges of gunfire occurred 
between UMWA miners and Chafin’s deputies. While 
the UMWA was still mobilizing towards Blair, most 
of their numbers, estimated anywhere between ten and 
fifteen thousand strong, were not yet present, giving 
Chafin’s forces, roughly two thousand troops, a rare 
instance of superior numbers. Whereas the UMWA 
vastly outnumbered the Blair deputies throughout 
the majority of the conflict, Chafin was backed by 
the Logan County Coal Operators Association, 
representing anti-union mining operations in the area, 
who essentially provided Chafin with a heavily armed, 
14  Rebecca Bailey. Interview with Gladys Hood. Matewan Oral History Project. (Matewan Development Center, Matewan, 1990.) 
Gladys’ recollection of Sheriff Chafin stressed his anti-union sentiments and the fear he inspired throughout Logan County.
15  Rebecca Bailey. Interview with Gladys Hood. Matewan Oral History Project. (Matewan Development Center, Matewan, 1990.) 
Gladys Hood, resident of Matewan, lived through the West Virginia Mine Wars.
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private army. By comparison, the UMWA, while 
armed as well, were poorly equipped and nowhere near 
as collectively organized as Chafin’s better prepared 
forces were. These critical factors heavily played into 
the outcomes of the majority of skirmishes that made 
up the collective battle. 
The initial conflict on August 25th was 
a decisive victory on Chafin’s part as the small 
UMWA forces were repelled from Blair. Following 
this exchange, President Warren Harding’s threat of 
deploying federal troops and even bombing union 
forces prompted the UMWA to disband their efforts 
and begin to return home16. Harding’s threat, driven 
primarily by his anti-union sentiments tied to his view 
that unionization was synonymous with communism, 
may have, at the time, been toothless as military 
intervention would have been viewed by the American 
public as too extreme of a response. Regardless of the 
seriousness of the president’s threat, it was successful 
in diffusing the situation and may have been the end of 
the conflict. However, rumor of Chafin shooting union 
sympathizers near Blair following the president’s 
threat reinvigorated the UMWA’s anger towards the 
sheriff. Word was spread quickly, and UMWA miners 
returning home from Blair made an about face and 
rushed back to the mountain to regroup. By Blizzard’s 
account, this was Chafin’s attempt to provoke the 
UMWA and instigate a full-scale battle with federal 
backing on his side. 
Ironically, the idea of utilizing federal support 
was shared by the UMWA, as many in their leadership 
hoped a demonstration of force would indicate 
the severity of their fight against non-union coal 
operations and bring the issue to a national level. This 
was a driving force behind why the UMWA decided 
to stand down when President Harding threatened 
to intervene with the army, as taking on the federal 
government went against the miners’ interests. While 
non-union coal operators and their allies, especially 
in the coal commission report, painted the UMWA as 
communists, the UMWA was in no way opposing the 
federal government and always remained democratic 
in nature. A second reason why army involvement 
deterred the UMWA from continuing their attack was 
the fact that many of the miners were veterans of WWI 
and had no interest in fighting against a military they 
had previously served. Shogan notes in an interview 
that the UMWA sentiment towards clashing with the 
army could be summed up in one simple phrase, “we 
won’t go to war with Uncle Sam”17. 
Despite the previous threat of federal 
involvement, the UMWA did return to Blair, and on 
August 29th, the battle resumed in earnest. Chafin’s 
forces maintained defensive positions, taking advantage 
of the high ground the mountain provided, and were 
able to stop the miners’ advance a second time. Once 
again, this was accomplished by means of heavier 
firepower at Chafin’s disposal. Employing the use of 
private planes, Chafin’s troops hit the UMWA forces 
with a series of airstrikes, using military-grade gas and 
16  Robert Shogan. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising. (New York City: Basic Books, 2006), 
271. President Harding: “It looks to me as though we are coming to a crisis in the conflict between the radical labor leaders and the 
capitalistic system under which we developed our Republic.”
17  Focus, Shogan describing the UMWA’s refusal to fight against federal forces deployed to Blair Mountain at the end of the engagement.
explosive bombs presumed to be surplus from WWI18. 
The army, under orders from General Billy Mitchell, 
often considered the father of the American Air Force, 
deployed Martin bombers as well as contributing 
further to Chafin’s air support, but these planes were 
utilized strictly for surveillance, as it would still be 
several days before the federal government would take 
an active role in the battle’s resolution19. 
This bombing campaign is a matter of great 
confusion, both for those involved in the battle and their 
subsequent accounts. Some assumed the bombs were 
dropped by the U.S. Army, having seen U.S. Army 
planes making flyovers during the battle. Mentions of 
army munitions being used in the bombing suggest 
U.S. military backing without direct involvement 
in the attack. The reality, as best understood by a 
consideration of all available sources, is that the bombs 
were homemade explosives created by Chafin’s forces 
and deployed by local pilots operating private planes. 
The U.S. Army’s Martin bombers, while armed, did not 
take any part in the bombing campaign and were present 
for reconnaissance purposes only, as Federal troops 
were not instructed to take aggressive action against the 
UMWA forces until days later on September 2nd20. 
Despite Chafin’s vastly superior arms, the 
UMWA continued fighting, and on August 30th, West 
Virginia National Guard Colonel William Eubanks was 
brought in to take charge of combined law enforcement 
and vigilante forces fighting the UMWA21. The swell 
in numbers to the anti-union forces did not deter the 
UMWA, however, and the miners continued their attack, 
almost managing to reach Logan during one assault, 
only a short distance from their goal of Mingo County. 
Skirmishes continued until September 2nd, 
when federal troops were officially deployed to 
combat the UMWA, which prompted Bill Blizzard to 
call a withdrawal of his forces. The miners disbanded 
and began returning home, many of them stowing their 
weapons away in the secret caches in the woods in an 
attempt to avoid detection. Casualty counts differ from 
source to source, but anywhere between ten and thirty 
members of Chafin’s forces were killed along with 
another fifty to a hundred UMWA miners. Charges of 
murder, conspiracy to commit murder, accessory to 
murder, and treason against the state of West Virginia 
were brought up against a total of nine hundred and 
eighty-five miners including Blizzard himself, who, 
once again, assumed a leadership role for the UMWA22. 
18  William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 303. W.F. Denim and Earl Halloran, two of the three pilots hired 
by the coal operators, maintain they used their planes for “observation” only, while R.S. Haynes, the third pilot, admits to the pilots 
using explosive and gas bombs on the miners.
19  Ibid, 311. Blizzard attests that Mitchell was present in the hopes of finding an excuse to test out the effectiveness of new planes in a 
military setting.
20  William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 313. One of the pilots operating in this mission stated that before 
returning to base, the crew jettisoned their bombs in the James River, presumably in an effort to disguise the fact they had been armed 
in the first place. The only active participants in the bombing campaign were the planes under Chafin’s command, although this would 
not be made clear to many on the ground during the battle until after its conclusion.
21  William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 303. Eubanks estimated that over the course of the battle, his 
forces fired anywhere between 500,000 and 600,000 rounds of ammunition, and that the miners “wasted as much as we did.”
22  Ibid, 342. Having been positioned as the leader of the UMWA forces during the Battle of Blair Mountain, Blizzard had to be the center 
point of the coal operators’ prosecution of the union. However, unless Blizzard was found responsible for the actions of all the miners 
at the battle, the case against him personally was not strong, which led to his eventual equital.
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Some UMWA members were imprisoned for 
years, but the last to be paroled were released in 192523. 
During Blizzard’s trial, unexploded bombs dropped 
by Chafin’s forces that were recovered by the miners 
and were used as evidence in defense of the UMWA24, 
painting Chafin, and, by extension, the coal industry 
as brutally violent and tyrannical25. In April of 1922, 
at Jefferson County Circuit Courthouse, after having 
been held at the same jail26 where John Brown had 
been tried for his role in the battle at Harper’s Ferry 
years before27, all charges against Bill Blizzard were 
dropped, and he was released from the state’s custody28. 
Blizzard’s release was met with mixed responses from 
the gathered crowd, with some lauding him a hero of 
workers’ rights, while others felt justice had not been 
served. Perhaps the most sobering comments from the 
court’s proceedings that day came from Colonel C. W. 
Osenton, principal counsel for the state in Blizzard’s 
case. Osenton, referring to the first skirmish that began 
the Battle of Blair Mountain, stated: 
But your men did not give John Gore, [Logan 
County Sheriff’s Deputy], Munsey or Cafalgo, 
[both Blair locals working as part of Chafin’s 
militia], a chance, when Munsey, dying with 
a bullet through his neck, pleaded for mercy, 
your men put a high-powered rifle to his head 
and pulled the trigger on the ammunition you 
probably gave him the night before, Bill. His 
head bounded eight inches off the ground, and 
then he died. I ask you, jurymen, to show Bill 
more mercy than his army did those men or the 
women and children of Logan valley.”29 
Osenton’s comment here, in many ways, can 
summarize the entire experience of Blizzard’s trial. 
Blizzard himself was not present at this skirmish and 
had no direct connection whatsoever to the deaths of 
23  Bituminous Operators’ Special Committee to the United States Coal Commission, “The United Mine Workers in West Virginia.” [S.l. : 
s.n., 1923], 67. Lists the acquittals of several prominent members of the UMWA including Blizzard, J. E. Willburn, and Walter Allen.
24  William C. Blizzard When Miners March. (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010), 341. The state’s forces openly admitted to dropping bombs 
on the miners when the recovered homemade explosive was displayed as evidence in Blizzard’s trial.
25  State of West Virginia v. William Blizzard, Indictment No. 4, Special Plea No. 2
26  Bituminous Operators’ Special Committee to the United States Coal Commission, “The United Mine Workers in West Virginia.” [S.l. 
: s.n., 1923], 66. Charles Town, WV.
27  Karen Whitman. “Re-evaluating John Brown’s Raid at Harpers Ferry” West Virginia Archives and History Vol 34, number 1. Charleston: 
1972, 46. On October 16th, 1859, John Brown, led an attack on the Federal Arsenal at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia with the intention 
of supplying slaves with weapons and staging a revolt against slave owners in West Virginia. John Brown has been lauded and vilified 
for his actions throughout history as he is depicted as either a champion of liberty, an enemy of the state, or a roadblock for the 
Abolitionist movement and peaceful negotiations between the North and South over the issue of slavery.
28  State of West Virginia v. William Blizzard, Indictment No. 4, Special Plea No. 2
29  “’Disgrace to State,’ Some Yell, But Great Mass Cheer Verdict. Never Had Intention to Commit Treason, Blizzard Says.” Charleston 
Gazette, May 28th, 1922. The event Osenton is referring to was part of the initial skirmish that snowballed into the Battle of Blair 
Mountain in which John Gore, a Logan County sheriff’s deputy, along with John Cofago and Jim Munsey, two local miners who sided 
with Chafin’s forces, were discovered by UMWA forces, after having fired upon the UMWA camp at night. Upon being discovered, 
Gore called for a standoff and Reverend John Wilburn, a Blair Baptist preacher and leader of the UMWA forces, advanced forward 
to meet with Gore. A shootout erupted, believed to be initiated by either Cofago or Munsey, which left Gore and Cofago dead along 
with Eli Kemp, one of the UMWA miners. Munsey, badly wounded and pleading for mercy, was shot through the head where he lay 
by Henry Kitchin, a UMWA miner. One of the miners described Munsey’s body as looking “like water out of a hose where you turn 
it on and the pressure is light.”
the aforementioned men, but as Blizzard had assumed 
responsibility for the actions of the UMWA during the 
events of the Battle of Blair Mountain, he would have 
to bear the responsibility, due to the fact that Gore, 
Cofago and Munsey were killed by UMWA forces. 
Since Blizzard was not involved directly or indirectly 
with the event itself, he could not be found guilty of 
their murder. Much of Blizzard’s trial proceeded in 
a similar fashion, where the state was unable to link 
Blizzard directly with the most serious crimes they 
attached to the UMWA’s actions.
Blizzard’s release and the resilience of union 
sympathy in West Virginia would perhaps be the most 
resounding success for the UMWA with regard to the 
outcome of the Battle of Blair Mountain, for while they 
lost the conflict itself, their goal of presenting the coal 
industry on a national stage as cruel and unjust was 
largely successful. Despite this fact, the Battle of Blair 
Mountain was the nail in the coffin for the UMWA as 
a whole. The fight to unionize the West Virginia coal 
fields was a resounding loss, which was later followed 
by Pennsylvania’s and Kentucky’s unions hold on coal 
mining operations collapsing and leaving Illinois as 
the only unionized state remaining. 
The Battle of Blair Mountain and the West 
Virginia Mine Wars as a whole left a stain on the 
reputation of unions, whether affiliated with the conflict 
or not, as violent communists seeking to overthrow 
the government. This fallacy was propagated by anti-
union coal operators and featured heavily in the coal 
commission report which, along with newspapers 
reporting on the event, received national attention. 
Much in the same way the Haymarket Affair in Chicago 
created the misconception of anarchists as bomb 
throwers, the Battle of Blair Mountain was presented 
as the inevitable outcome of any union activity. In this 
sense, the Battle of Blair Mountain can be considered 
a complete victory, both militarily and politically, for 
the coal industry, but the impact of the battle did not 
end there. 
While the battle damaged the reputation of 
unions as a whole for years, it also exposed the plight 
of mine workers, and the terrible conditions they 
worked under that motivated them to armed resistance 
in the first place. As a result, a new wave of the labor 
movement was established during the 1930s, starting 
with more progressive labor laws under the New Deal 
in 1933 and continuing with the founding of even 
larger and more prominent unions such as the Steel 
Workers, whose founding incorporated former UMWA 
members. In this sense, the Battle of Blair Mountain, 
while a loss for the UMWA in accomplishing their 
short-term goals, was successful in their larger effort 
of swaying federal support to their side, albeit long 
after the conflict itself ended. 
While understanding who the victor of the 
battle was is fairly straightforward, responsibility for its 
instigation is far more muddled. As is the case in most 
conflicts, blame changes hands depending on which 
event in time is considered the instigation point. If the 
battle is only considered to have begun when the first 
shots were fired, then the UMWA could be considered 
responsible, as they made the conscious decision to 
arm themselves and march on Logan County, with 
the explicit intention of carrying out a jailbreak and 
vigilante justice. Stepping back further, the Baldwin-
Felts Detective Agency could be considered the 
instigators when they murdered Sid Hatfield, which 
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prompted the UMWA to march in the first place. 
Sheriff Chafin could be considered the escalator when 
he allegedly shot union sympathizers and provoked 
a reignition of the conflict after the UMWA had 
already stood down. Bill Blizzard could be considered 
responsible for his organization and command of the 
UMWA’s armed forces and encouragement to return 
to Blair after the UMWA had initially disbanded their 
forces. President Harding and the federal government, 
including the U.S. Army and National Guard, could 
also be considered culpable for the Battle of Blair 
Mountain, both for their lack of involvement in 
resolving the conflict between the UMWA and coal 
industry before it turned violent, as well as their 
incitement of violence against the UMWA, especially 
the suggestion of bombing the union, which doubtless 
inspired and encouraged Chafin’s own bombing 
campaign. As such, responsibility for the Battle of 
Blair Mountain, and the loss of lives on both sides of 
the engagement, cannot fall solely on a single person’s 
or organization's shoulders and is instead shared by all 
who were involved.
When considering the issue of responsibility 
for the Battle of Blair Mountain, reflect once more 
on Colonel Osenton’s remarks about Bill Blizzard 
during his trial, “show Bill more mercy than his 
army did those men or the women and children of 
Logan valley.”30 Osenton had no sympathy towards 
Blizzard’s cause and clearly believed that Blizzard and 
the UMWA bore the responsibility of instigating the 
battle, but, despite that fact, still felt that Blizzard did 
not deserve the same fate as those killed by his forces. 
This could point to Osenton’s capacity for mercy, but 
more likely indicates the extremely complex issue of 
ascribing blame to an event with a history as complex 
as the Battle of Blair Mountain. Certain individuals 
played instrumental roles in both the escalation and 
perpetuation of the conflict as well as its aftermath, but 
this does not change the fact that the Battle of Blair 
Mountain was the product of numerous individual and 
collective decisions carried out by a wide range of 
parties, each with their own interests and motivations. 
This created a tangled web of a conflict that it’s origin 
points is a matter of perspective and opinion rather 
than concrete fact. 
Since its conclusion in 1921, the Battle of 
Blair Mountain, while a national story at the time, has 
been relegated to the fringes of labor history. Both 
Blair Mountain, where the battle was fought, and the 
Charles Town courthouse, where Blizzard along with 
many other miners were tried, are both at risk of being 
destroyed. The courthouse’s status on the National 
Historic Register is up for debate, and Blair Mountain, 
a formerly protected site, is slowly being demolished 
as part of new coal mining operations. Blair and 
Logan County have both vanished, being transformed 
into union-incorporated territory and absorbed into 
other communities, along with dozens of other towns 
and counties in West Virginia that have experienced 
massive economic decline over the past hundred 
years. Tragically, erasure of the history of the Battle 
of Blair Mountain is being spurred on by the locations 
and communities involved in the event. This summer 
marks the hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Blair 
30  “’Disgrace to State,’ Some Yell, But Great Mass Cheer Verdict. Never Had Intention to Commit Treason, Blizzard Says.” Charleston 
Gazette, May 28th, 1922.
Mountain, and its passing should serve as a reminder 
that continued study, discussion, and awareness of the 
West Virginia Mine Wars, the most critical conflict 
in U.S. labor history, are needed now more than ever 
to help preserve these historical sites before they are 
relegated entirely to the past. The inspiration and goal 
of this piece was to call new audiences’ attention to 
this fascinating chapter in American history and ideally 
inspire further research of the study, so that its legacy 
and history can continue to be explored and shared with 
future generations of scholars and students of history. 
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